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This paper examines the current setting of instruments aimed at rebalancing unequal market 
power in the food chain. Particular attention is given to horizontal integration possibilities for 
farmers, and organisations of farmers, as derogations to competition policies contained in 
the Single Common Market Organisation Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 (CMO Regulation). We 
focus on how these derogations have been defined across agricultural sectors, including the 
Guidelines tabled by the European Commission. The ultimate objective is to assess whether 
the current policy framework would allow a smooth functioning of the food supply chain 
taking into consideration structural inequalities between actors along the chain, i.e. farmers, 
industry, and retailers while at the same time helping producers to improve their 
competitiveness. 
A literature review to understand sources of asymmetric price transmission (ATP) 
along the food chain led us to the conclusion that ATP is a source of welfare loses to the 
detriment of weaker actors (farmers and consumers).  
Research work focused on methods for understanding price transmission and identifying 
asymmetry sources. Empirical studies have pointed to market structure and the growing 
concentration of the processing and retail firms as the main reasons for asymmetric price 
transmission and unequal distribution of welfare along the food chain (Sexton 2000, Vavra 
and Goodwin 2005). Price transmission analysis identified sources of asymmetries, for 
example significant fixed costs, adjustment costs, inventory management and perishable 
products (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004, Vavra and Goodwin 2005, Fernandez and 
Crespo 2010, Acharya et al. 2011, Felis and Garrido 2015). Other studies underlined the role 
of agriculture policies in mitigating bargaining power imbalances (Russo Goodhue Sexton 
2011, Cacchiarelli Sorrentino 2013, Ciliberti Frascarelli 2013).  
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A branch of evidence based research has focused on understanding how the market 
functions under imperfect competition. Sexton (2013) and McCorriston (2013) have 
identified factors that may be impacting markets and price developments, other than 
increasing concentration in processing and retailing sectors. These factors are to be found 
between vertical related markets and within stages or with respect to the nature of vertical 
linkages between stages. They include vertical coordination and control between farming 
and downstream marketing stages; private labels, quality and differentiation, e.g. geographic 
location, certified safe and respecting fair-trade practises, consolidations through mergers 
and acquisitions,  unfair practises between firms in different stages leading to unequal rent 
distribution or practises inflicting consumer harm.  
The literature on interactions of cooperatives and antitrust policy and their role in 
improving market performance is extensive. Nash et al. (1996) have examined issues in 
the Australian context focusing on differences in effectiveness across sectors and regions, 
Youde and Helmberger (1996) analyse antirust policies and market power in the US, 
focusing on marketing associations. They consider cooperative marketing as desirable in 
atomistic structures where concentration in procurement is needed to reach economies of 
scale. Both Youde Helmberger (1996) and Bergman (1997) argue that cooperatives with 
restrictive membership should be treated as any other type of business. Based on results 
from an empirical model that allows price discrimination to be taken into account the 
European context, Bergman (1997) sustains that if cooperatives export a small fraction of 
their production and the degree of vertical integration is low, the presence of cooperatives 
may increase social efficiency by mitigating the market power of for-profit firms. On the 
contrary, cooperatives with high market share may discriminate between buyers. 
Research devoting more policy modelling that accounts for imperfect markets was scarce at 
the beginning of this century Mccorriston (2002), but a number of applications has been 
developed since then. The work of Russo, et al. (2011) highlights that, in presence of market 
power, benefits from decoupling agriculture support are smaller than under perfect 
competition (or even negative). They use an approach which relies on shifts in supply, 
demand or policy to identify and measure market power. Goodhue and Russo (2011) 
examine the interactions between agriculture policy and market power in the US flour milling 
industry. Using a non-parametric approach, they demonstrate that US wheat millers were 
able to increase their margins when farmers received payments through marketing. In other 
words, market power might allow redistributing benefits from government intervention. 
Sexton (2013) develops a theoretical model which takes into account vertical coordination, 
i.e. contracts between farmers and processors in presence of substantial investment costs 
and product differentiation. He finds that under these conditions buyers matter about the 
future and they would pay farmers as much or more than a under a competitive market, but 
in other settings where vertical coordination is not an issue, the exercise of market power 
would prevail.  
Empirical analysis on the impact of measures aimed at strengthening the bargaining 
power of farmers in the EU has focused so far on the role of producer organisations, 
cooperatives, association agreements and vertical integration of farmers in facilitating 
economies of scale, improve farmers profit, favour technology adoption and productivity, etc. 
Bijman et al. (2012) inquired the role of cooperatives in reducing the impacts of imbalances 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52
ND




in the food chain for their farmers. They had no results showing that individual cooperatives, 
including large transnationals like Friesland Campina and Arla Foods in the dairy sector, have 
sufficient market power to balance the power of the retail giants (although in regional 
markets they may hold a strong position). In the European retail supply market cooperatives 
face strong competition from other (foreign) cooperatives and from investor-owned firms 
(IOFs). The transparency that cooperatives apply in the pricing of their main raw material 
(e.g. milk or sugar) is beneficial for the bargaining power of retailers as it provides valuable 
market information. Theirs findings show that in markets where POs represent a large share, 
prices for dairy products are higher although this effect is not necessary attributable to the 
prices that individual POs pay.  
Van Hecke (2014) has examined efficiencies generated by POs through an extensive 
literature review. She reports that larger POs have been found to be more profitable as they 
can spread their fixed costs over larger sales volumes, and offer better prices as well. Larger 
POs offer in general also more services to their members than smaller POs, especially when 
these services are associated with significant investment costs. Evidence in the Italian 
context, where the use of contracts in the dairy, olive oil and fruit and vegetable sectors 
have introduced greater transparency in trade relationships between agro-food firms, show 
positive impacts on the financial management of farmers and food processors (Ciliberti and 
Cacciarelli 2013). Based on a series of studies that compared prices paid between POs and 
investors owned firms (IOFs) Van Hecke (2014) confirmed that prices paid by POs are higher 
than prices paid by IOFs (the so-called "yardstick theory"). As a consequence participation 
by POs could ensure a higher income to farmers. Conversely, little evidence was found of 
higher consumer prices associated with the presence of POs. 
The literature review on asymmetric price transmission along the food chain highlighted that 
its relevance is related to the potential welfare losses it may entail, notably to weaker actors. 
Higher concentration in the processing and retail stages makes farmers and consumers the 
natural candidates. This conclusion led us to scrutinise the current set of instruments aimed 
at improving the performance of markets through promoting farmers’ integration in various 
forms.. 
Divergent results emerged from studies on the relation between size and profitability or 
efficiency, with evidence of significant economies of scale. Larger PO would be more 
profitable as they can spread their fixed costs over larger sales volumes. In addition, 
because of this, they could be able to offer better prices. Larger POs may offer more services 
to their members, especially when these services are associated with significant investment 
costs. We also expect to find evidence of a positive relationship between participation in the 
PO and farm income for instance, thanks to higher prices received by farmers participating in 
POs.  
As a next step we scrutinise the current set of policy instruments. Exemptions to EU 
competition policy in the agricultural sector aiming at strengthening farmers' bargaining 
power have been in place since the CAP inception. Broadly speaking exceptions can be 
grouped in general and specific derogations2 (see Carrau 2012, Del Cont et al. 2012, Carrau 
                                                          
2  Derogations are specified in two Council regulations: Reg. 1234/2007 (Single CMO) and Reg. 
1184/2006. The Single CMO Regulation applies to products of Annex I of the TFEU and Regulation EC 
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2014 for a detailed analysis of derogations). A general derogation (Article 42 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU - TFEU) is applicable within the framework of the CAP and taking into 
account of Article 39 of the TFEU (“objectives of the CAP").  
The strengthening of the standing of farmers in the agricultural value chain is a declared 
objective of the European legislator for changes of the CAP legislation (together with other 
voluntary initiatives)3 within the 2013-2020 CAP reform. In line with this objective, the 
general exemption to agriculture is maintained in the new Market Organisation regulation 
(CMO Regulation)4 and sectorial coverage is widened under specific conditions. 
One prominent feature is the extension of the possibility to recognise horizontal, vertical 
agreements and inter-branch agreements to all agriculture products covered by the CMO, as 
well as the extension of the possibility of contractual negotiations (joint selling) to olive oil, 
beef and arable crops. POs, associations of POs and IBOs could receive financial support, 
under certain conditions, within Rural Development Programmes 5 . In addition, specific 
exemptions are defined and dealt on a case by case approach. 
Sector-specific provisions in the CMO that authorise joint activities are defined on a case by 
case approach. They include joint selling by producers/POs in certain sectors which go 
beyond what is permissible under general competition rules for agricultural markets.  
Provisions for contractual relations in the olive oil, beef and veal, and arable crops sectors. 
(Articles 169-171 CMO regulation) are meant to secure possibilities for enhanced cooperation 
for Producer organisations (POs), in addition to what is already permissible under the 
existing exemptions from competition rules. In other words, the purpose of these Articles is 
to strengthen the bargaining power of producers, while at the same time avoiding the 
creation and exertion of market power. Within this objective, the provisions contain 
safeguards and quantitative thresholds to ensure a level playing field for all operators 
In order to help farmers and national competition authorities interpret and apply these 
provisions, the European Commission has tabled a document containing Guidelines for 
implementation (EC, 2015). The Guidelines are also meant to ensure legal consistency across 
EU Member States, as requested by the Parliament during the legislative process of the 2013 
CAP reform. The guidelines specify conditions POs must comply to benefit from the 
derogations, including the recognition of POs and associations of POs, the pursue of specific 
objectives, the creation of significant efficiencies, relations between the PO, its members, 
and the Cap on quantities subject to contractual relations and notifications obligations. 
Joint selling by POs in the fruit and vegetables sector: As POs and APOs in the fruit and 
vegetables sector fulfil a particular role, they are granted Union financial assistance in the 
framework of operational programmes. With a view towards amplifying their effectiveness, 
POs in fruit and vegetables are required to sell the entire production of their members (with 
certain exceptions, e.g. for on-farm sale). Unlike collective negotiation possibilities foreseen 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
No 1184/2006 to products listed in Annex I TFEU with the exception of those covered by the single 
CMO Regulation. 
3  For example the High Level group on the Functioning of the Food Chain and the Food Chain 
Initiative. 
4 Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 
5 Regulation (EU) 1305/2013 
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in the milk, arable crops, olive oil and beef sectors – there is no market share cap on a 
Producer Organisation/APO which intends to engage in joint selling.  
Standard written contracts in the milk sector 6 : the joint sale of raw milk by POs was 
introduced by the so-called 'milk package'7, where the price payable for the delivery may be 
set in a so-called model of “written contract”8. Unlike the provisions on olive oil, beef and 
arable crops, the possibility of milk POs to jointly sell (and set prices) for the raw milk of 
their members is limited only by certain (generous) quantitative thresholds (up to 33% of 
national production per PO). 
Collective negotiations in the sugar sector. The quota system for sugar applies until the end 
of the 2016/2017 marketing year (Article 124 CMO Regulation).  There will no longer be a 
guaranteed sugar beet price as from that date. The question arises whether growers will be 
able to continue to collectively negotiate prices with producers after the end of the quota 
regime, as is the current practice. Unlike in the milk, arable crops, olive oil and beef sectors 
there is no explicit collective negotiation provision for sugar beet growers in the CMO.  
However, the rules for the sugar sector do provide for the collective negotiation of inter-
professional agreements between associations of beet growers and sugar manufacturers (so-
called 'agreements within the trade').  
The CMO Regulation relies on Producer Organisations as the main vehicle for producer 
cooperation (i.e. extension of the possibilities for agreements in all agricultural sectors) but 
the current legislative setting could lead to the paradoxical consequence of challenging the 





In relation to policy measures aimed at improving the functioning of the food supply chain, 
the CMO Regulation relies on Producer Organisations as the main vehicle for producer 
cooperation.  But the current legislative setting could lead to the paradoxical consequence of 
impeding the functioning, by challenging the existence and/or creation of POs. There is no 
requirement for a specific legal form for the recognition of a Producer Organisation. 
Cooperatives are among the most common organisational forms of establishment in the 
agricultural sector, especially in Eastern Member States.  However, cooperatives (as legal 
form of establishment) are not legally referenced.  While cooperatives may in practice often 
fulfil the requirements for recognition as a Producer Organisation, the CMO rules on 
Producer Organisations apply to cooperatives only where Producer Organisation recognition 
has been officially granted by the Member State. 
In particular, the derogation for the joint sale of produce by cooperatives does not appear 
clearly in the Single CMO. Since competition forbids the charging of identical prices, joint 
selling may be seen as equating to charging identical prices. Thus operations by cooperatives 
could be exempted only under the general competition rules, if the conditions, i.e. creation 
                                                          
6 Articles 148 and 149 CMO Regulation 
7 This package is one of the remedies to tackle the persistent weakness of this market after the 
abolition of the Quota Regime.   
8 Regulation (EU) 261/2012 
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of efficiencies, benefits for consumers, no disproportionate restriction of competition, are 
fulfilled. The exemptions available under general competition rules offer only limited 
protection for the joint sale of products at a common price, arguably the main purpose of a 
great many agricultural cooperatives. The typical commercial practices of cooperatives have 
not been challenged by national competition authorities as potentially anti-competitive 
horizontal cooperation among individual producers.   
The case of cooperatives provides a hint of the paradoxical situation that could be faced in 
the future. Uncertainty, divergent interpretations and difficulties for POs in complying with 
minimum requirements for exemption may represent a deterrent to the existence/recognition 
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